It is possible that I am overly paranoid about computerized voting systems. The thing is, I know technology too well. It is my job, my hobby and at times a bit of an obsession. I program, build and fix computerized systems all day long. In fact, my main role at work is designing and programming customized touchscreen control systems. If those words sound familiar that is because it's the same technology being used in electronic voting systems around the country. I have designed complex touchscreen voting systems for local city council chambers. To make a short story long...I am aware of the technology.I have followed the issue of electronic voting very closely for some time now. As the election draws near, I am becoming more and more disturbed by the idea of how the electronic voting systems in use today may impact the presidential election. I have been known to say that computers should never be used for voting, but that is not entirely true. There are ways to develop and administer fair elections with computerized voting systems...the problem is that we are not using those solutions.
Nationwide, states and counties have been awarding voting system contracts to low bidders who are overly secretive at best and antagonistic at worst in regard to the accuracy of the systems. Security and technology experts are routinely excluded from the input and decision making process. I am concerned.
To understand the problem, first you have to understand the methods being used. Electronic voting systems fall into three main groups:
1. Paper based electronic voting systems.
Paper based systems require voters to mark a ballot in some physical way that will allow a device to later scan it and record the vote. You might punch a hole, mark it with a special pen or even use a touchscreen. The end result is the same, you will leave the voting booth with a ballot that physically reflects your vote. There is typically some way for you to look at the ballot and verify that your vote was marked as you intended.
When the polls close, the physical ballots are transported to locations where they can be scanned and counted by machine. When a stack of ballots is fed into the machine, they will either have their vote recorded, they will be flagged as having no marked vote (undervote) or they will be flagged as having more than one marked vote (overvote).
Paper based systems allow for a physical inspection of the ballots and a manual recount as there are actual physical ballots that can be read.
2. Direct Recording Electronic voting systems (DRE's)
DRE systems are stand-alone computers that provide an interface for a voter to cast a vote. Each DRE machine would be preloaded with the custom ballot software for the precinct. You might record your vote by pressing an actual button or using a touchscreen. Once you have cast your vote, it would be stored in the internal memory of the device (think hard drive) or on some sort of removable memory card (think the memory card in your camera). DRE systems may or may not provide you with a receipt indicating your vote.
When the polls close, each device will report the vote totals it has recorded in one of a few ways. It may print a receipt of the totals. It may transmit the totals over a network to a central location. It may require the device or the removable memory card be transported to a location where the results can be read by election officials.
As the votes are stored digitally, there is no ability to manually inspect votes.
3. Network DRE voting systems
Network DRE systems are very similar to standalone DRE's. They may look the same and to the voter they will work in the same way, however there are important differences. Unlike standalone systems, Network DRE's depend on an internet connection to function properly and to record a vote. The ballot information is not loaded onto each machine, but rather it is supplied over the network. Instead of storing results on the device, results are transmitted to the centralized location in batches throughout the day. There are even areas experimenting with allowing people to vote over the internet on their personal computers.
When the polls close, there is no need to deal with vote tabulation from individual machines as the results have been transmitted throughout the day.
As the votes are stored digitally, there is no ability to manually inspect votes.
Everyone remembers the 2000 presidential election so it is no shock that things can go wrong. What is shocking to me is that electronic vote counting problems seem to be worse now than they were in 2000.
Up Next... Part 2: How electronic voting systems fail (also known as: what the hell happened in Palm Beach County during the August 2008 Primary vote count)
